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Public Policy and Law Since Love Canal:
Unintended and Unforseen Consequepces
of Love Canal and the Superfund Legislation
Robert S. Berger*
I would like to focus on the unintended and unforseen
consequences of Love Canal and the passage of Superfund legisla-
tion, instead of the broader issues of environmental regulation and
policy and reforming the Superfund program. I also want to tie back
to how the conference began and reflect on what we have heard.
Love Canal was initially seen as a health issue. In large part,
Superfund was passed to address the serious health issues resulting
from the severe problem of toxic contamination. There was little
recognition of the significant impact that this legislafion would have
on land use. The first real statement that I found by someone
recognizing this aspect was Chuck Powers' report for Clean Sites,
where he stated that for every Superfund site one must ask, "what, in
light of what has happened at a specific site, are we going to do with
this site ... what is the appropriate long term use of this site .. ?"T
Although others may have thought of it before Chuck Powers,
it still was monumental in 1992 when he reflected on this aspect of
the Superfund legislation arising from Love Canal. It was one of the
great anomalies of environmental law that the statute created to
address the hazardous waste problem, whose medium was land itself,
barely acknowledged that the locus of these wastes and releases was
local property. I am going to trace the evolution of the land use issues,
their relationship to brownfields and some of the unforeseen, and
unusual, consequences resulting from them. Certainly, I will not
attempt to give this in great detail. We have heard enough information
regarding the liability scheme of Superfund to know that it is an
extremely comprehensive program. However, when we look beyond
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the federal legislation to recognize the numerous state Superfund
programs, as well as the many opportunities for private individuals or
companies to sue those potentially responsible in either a private cost
recovery or contribution action, what emerges is an enormous and
extensive liability scheme. One basis for liability particularly relevant
to the land use issues is ownership. According to present law, the
current property owner is financially liable for the clean-up of that
property required by Superfund programs. The justification is that
environmental waste sites must be cleaned up and someone must bear
the expense; consequently, it is deemed irrelevant whether the current
owner actually disposed of the hazardous waste.
Thus, one positive development resulting from the current
owner liability provision was the creation of a system in which an
environmental assessment ofproperties involved in land transactions
became vital. Environmental assessments have created additional
work for environmental lawyers and consultants and assessments are
now accepted as a standard component of land transactions. Certainly
the liability concerns that we have discussed apply to all land
transactions of properties once used for industrial or commercial
purposes, a large amount of the available land is many urban areas.
There are a number of other liability concerns which arose
with respect to land transactions. As a result of Superfund liability,
banks were concerned for their own potential liability, known as
lender liability. Consequently, they were extremely nervous about any
financial involvement in transactions where contamination was a
concern. No one wanted to fall victim to the "Superfund Net" and
bear the costs of clean-up. The result was recognition of a new
problem, relating to properties which were not Superfund sites, but
which many claimed flowed from the liability scheme of the
Superfund program. For the past five years we have referred to these
properties as "brownfields." The original Environmental Protection
Agency definition of a brownfield is an "abandoned, idled, or
underused industrial or commercial facility where expansion or
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental
contamination." There is certainly a genuine question as to how many
brownfield properties cannot be redeveloped due to Superfund
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liability concerns. This is the subject of serious debate and actually
involves properties not subject to Superfund liability as well, such as
those with petroleum contamination. For my purposes I am discussing
all of them together. In certain circumstances, I believe the liability
issue merely serves as an excuse for suburban development. Pointing
to the liability concerns, developers claim that redeveloping an inner
city property is not feasible.
There is no doubt, though, that as a result of the liability
scheme there are clearly properties, particularly those in the distressed
inner city areas, which have a "negative value," that is the cost of
cleaning them up exceeds any market value of the property when
clean. This, in turn, leads to some very strange results. One is
municipalities not wanting to foreclose on properties for back taxes,
either because of fear of their own liability or because they cannot sell
them to anyone. This leaves the land in limbo. The second is the
situation where properties are not put up for sale or reused by their
owners, but simply sit idle.
These properties once were seen as having a stigma and
nobody, particularly municipal development authorities, wanted to
have any of its land called a brownfield. No one wanted to own the
next "Love Canal." But in the last few years this has switched around
dramatically. Now it seems everything is being called a brownfield
when redevelopment is planned or occurring. Indeed, we find EPA in
the last few years involved in urban initiatives and redevelopment of
inner cities, taking the lead in certain federal efforts. This apparently
created some tension with HUD, which traditionally has been the
agency heading urban redevelopment initiatives.
So how did these recent changes stem from Love Canal and
the 20 years following it? First, agencies moved away from
enforcement. We have heard much about that. EPA then moved some
of its Superfund money toward brownfields, including its $200,000
"pilot" grants. Second, consultants and attorneys, reacting to these
changes and looking for new areas, found brownfields. Third,
economic incentives associated with brownfield initiatives were
begun, such as the 1996 New York Bond Act.
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No one twenty years ago could have foreseen this resulting
from Love Canal and the Superfund legislation. Certainly evolution
in other areas of environmental policy also have fueled this concern
with redevelopment in urban areas being viewed as an environmental
issue. These include the concepts of "sustainable development" and
"environmental justice." Still, the real direct link is to the unintended
consequences of the legislative reaction to Love Canal.
Let me close with two general conclusions. First, this brief
story reminds us that often we have public policies that come into
existence in a manner that was never intended and surely never
foreseen. Moreover, once you put a major program in place, it is not
easy to stop it or change it. Instead, we find that there are reactions to
the unintended consequences which can create whole "programs"
themselves, such as brownfields. This ultimately may be a good result
for urban revitalization, even if not what we expected as a legacy of
Love Canal.
The second conclusion is rather ironic and not as hopeful.
Whereas we have heard in detail how the responses to Love Canal
and the resulting Superfund legislation were originally due to the
efforts of local community groups, much of the initial legislative
response to the brownfields problem by states has treated public
participation and community involvement as, at best, an afterthought.
Still, the lessons of Love Canal have at least forced EPA and most
states to ensure some minimal notice and public involvement aspects
to their brownfield programs. This too hopefully will be an evolving
development.
